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TITLE: THE BA-ATH PARTY IN IRAQ.

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

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
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Reg. 1/11 5/6
BRITISH EMBASSY
BAGHDAD

28 February 1970

(2/8)

Dear Sir,

Ba'ath Party Congress

The National Assembly building in Baghdad was, between 15/16 February and 22/23 February, the scene of an unusual amount of activity, the flags of Arab nations flew from its flagpoles, the military guard was reinforced with tanks, and rows of large cars including President Bakr's were parked outside it, often till late in the evening. The consensus of opinion here is that a party congress, perhaps even the long-awaited 10th Congress of the International Ba'ath Party, was taking place. Speculation onto the subjects under discussion includes the Kurdish settlement, party appointments and the liquidation of American interests (including their interest in I.P.C.) following the recent confrontation states meeting in Cairo.

2. Officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs including the Under Secretary when ~~taxed~~ by the Ambassador about "the Party Congress" did not deny its existence. However, not a word about any such meeting has appeared in the Iraqi press, and, more significantly, the Beirut press which would never miss an occasion such as this has not yet (as far as we here are aware) made any mention of a Party Congress but did report that preparation for one has been under way in Baghdad.

3. The absence of any publicity suggests that this has not been the full International Party Congress but, more likely, a final preparatory meeting of country representatives. This would not of course rule out the discussion of matters of substance.

Yours sincerely

Mike
(M.K.Jenner)

P.R.M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.,
London S.W.1.
c.c. Chanceries: Beirut
Amman
Cairo

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BAGHDAD

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Dr. Munif al Razzaz and the Iraqi Ba'ath

We recently received from Peter Joy in Beirut an extract from Al Hayat of 2 March reporting on the recent National Ba'ath Party Conference here. According to this article, based on "information received from Baghdad", one of the features of the Conference was a leftward move aimed at promoting a rapprochement with Hafez al Assad and the Syrian Ba'ath. Again according to the article, the majority of those taking part in the Conference were leftist, and Marxist attitudes prevailed; Amin al Hafiz, the "right-wing" Syrian Ba'athist leader expelled by the present Syrian regime in 1966, declined even to nominate himself as a candidate for election to the new National Command; and Munif al Razzaz, the Jordanian Secretary-General of the Party, who was expelled from Syria at the same time as Amin al Hafiz, failed to secure election.

2. I do not know whether any members of your Embassy are in touch with Munif al Razzaz, who, as far as we know, is now living in Amman. Glen Balfour Paul had two long and interesting sessions with him when he was in London for hospital treatment last summer and found him singularly forthcoming about the machinations within the Ba'ath Party. (He wrote a book about the collapse of the "right-wing" Ba'ath in Syria under the title Al-Tajriba Al-Marra.) If any of you do know him, perhaps you could find out from him what truth there is in Al Hayat's account of a leftward lurch at the Conference here. There haven't been many other signs of a rapprochement under the Syrians.

(P. McKearney)

B.L. Strachan Esq.,
British Embassy,
Amman.

Copy to
P. Joy Esq., O.B.E.,
British Embassy,
Beirut.

P.R.M. Hinchcliffe Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
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(5 February, 1970)

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RESEARCH DEPARTMENT MEMORANDUM

THE IRAQI BA'ATH (JULY 1968-JANUARY 1970)

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SUMMARY

A. The memorandum aims at presenting a picture of the Ba'ath régime which has been in power in Iraq since July 1968. (Paragraphs 1-2.)

B. The previous Ba'ath régime, that of 1963, had never commanded much support in the country, and fell largely because of its own internal divisions. It was one of the most unpopular régimes ever to have governed in Iraq. (Paragraphs 3-5.)

C. There were two successful *coups* in Baghdad in July 1968: the first engineered by a coalition of Right-wing Ba'athists and a group of army officers known as "The Palace Group"; the second by the Ba'ath against their erstwhile collaborators. Both were bloodless, and in both the attitude of the Republican Guard and of the Baghdad garrison were of decisive importance. (Paragraphs 6-9.)

D. On coming to power the Regional Command outlined a political programme which followed predictable lines, but which was concerned initially with the ways and means of keeping itself in power. Latterly, with 18 months of control behind it, it has begun to show signs of attempting to practice what it preached. (Paragraphs 10-16.)

E. It has been least successful in its attempts to broaden the basis of its rule by creation of a National Front which would include other political groups, and it has all along adopted methods of calculated severity as a means of suppressing opposition. Its rule is that of a minority clique whose internal cohesion is by no means certain. (Paragraphs 17-21.)

F. The Government appears to be one of few strengths, but to be conducted by determined and often ruthless men who have no intention of sharing power with anyone else. So far they have been successful in consolidating their hold on the country, and so long as they can retain control of the armed forces a counter-coup seems unlikely to succeed.

Annex A. The Regional Command Council in Iraq.

Annex B. The structure of the Ba'ath Party.

I. Introduction

The Ba'ath Party in Iraq first came to power as the result of the *coup* of February 1963 in which Abdel Kerim Qasim was overthrown and assassinated, and held office for some nine months before being ousted by the man whom it had chosen as its figurehead, President Abdel Salam Aref. The Ba'ath boasted that its eclipse would be of short duration, and that it would soon return to power, but in the event it had to wait nearly five years, until July 1968.

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2. It is the object of this memorandum to try and place the present régime in its proper perspective against the background of Iraqi politics, to discover in what ways it resembles or differs from its predecessor, to examine its ideology, methods and party organisation and, finally, to decide whether in fact the party has a political viability of its own, or whether it merely affords political cover for a group of opportunist and not very united army officers.

II. The background to the coup of July 1968

3. Its nine months in power in 1963 showed clearly how little genuine support the Ba'ath was able to command in the country as a whole, and how far it was from being able to maintain the semblance of unity. For this there were a number of reasons—the peculiarities of the party organisation which placed a premium on secretiveness and élitism, its pan-Arabism as opposed to Iraqi nationalism, the strong contrast between its democratic and even liberal ideologies and its authoritarian and repressive methods of rule, its nepotism, corruption and lack of administrative ability, and its use of violence and of the National Guard for the purpose of paying off old scores and of maintaining itself in power.

4. By the time it fell it had probably achieved the distinction of having been the most unpopular régime ever to have governed Iraq, and President Aref who, whatever else his weaknesses and foibles, had a remarkable understanding of the characteristics of the men with whom he had to deal, coupled with a real flair for political intrigue, had little difficulty in getting rid of a régime which was not only detested, but had also been hopelessly weakened by its own dissensions.

5. The Ba'ath which was ousted in the "apostasy" of November 1963⁽¹⁾ was no longer a united party, and the split which first appeared during its months in power was deepened even further during the period of "negative militancy" covering the years between 1964 and 1968. By the beginning of 1967 it was possible to distinguish two separate Ba'ath groups in Iraq—the Right-wing Ba'ath, composed mainly of those who had led the party in 1963 and which was still associated with the International Command, led by Michel Aflaq, thus enabling them to entitle themselves the Regional Ba'ath (*Al Hizb al Ba'ath fi Qutr al Iraq*) and a Left-wing group, Marxist in ideology (*Al Ba'ath al Yasiri*) and aligned with the neo-Ba'athists who had overthrown Hafiz al Amin in Syria. There was also a much smaller, extremist group, of which the leading personality was Ali Saleh al Sa'adi, Deputy Prime Minister in the 1963 Government, whose methods as controller of the National Guard in 1963 had contributed greatly to the fall of the régime. It was the first of these, the Right-wing Ba'ath, which participated in the *coup* of 17 July, 1968, and then itself carried out the further *coup* of 30 July; and while it has some claim to be regarded as representative of orthodox Ba'athism, it is noticeable that, as happened with previous Ba'ath régimes, both in Iraq and Syria, the expediences of the exercise of power have tended to make nonsense of party doctrine. There are, however, signs that with the exercise of power, and the increasing confidence thus generated, the Government is making genuinely determined efforts to carry out the programme devised during the latter months of 1968.

III. The coups of July 1968

6. On 17 July, 1968, a number of officers known as the "Palace Group", allegedly also members of the Arab Revolutionary Movement, in conjunction with a number of Right-wing Ba'athists carried out a bloodless *coup* which resulted

⁽¹⁾ Two such "apostasies" have taken their place in the canon of current Right-wing Ba'ath political jargon—that of 18 November, 1963, resulting in the fall and disintegration of the party in Iraq, and that of 23 February, 1966, in which Hafiz al Amin's régime in Syria was overthrown in the *coup* led by Saleh al Jedid.

in the deposition and exile of President Abdel Rahman Aref. The part played by the officers was underlined by the appointment of one of their number, Colonel Abdel Razzag Nayef (Director of Military Intelligence), as Prime Minister, and of another, Lieutenant-Colonel Ibrahim Abdel Rahman Daud (OC Republican Guard Brigade), as Minister of Defence. The Presidency went to a veteran Ba'athist, General Ahmed Hassan al Bakr, who had been Prime Minister in 1963, and the Ministry of the Interior to another, General Saleh Mehdi Ammash. The key posts in the Government were thus allotted to the planners of the 17 July *coup*, the remainder being given in the main to professionals who were experts in their respective spheres, Salih Kubba at the Ministry of Finance, Nasr al Hani at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Mahdi Hantoush at the Ministry of Oil.

7. The new Government was thus a coalition between Right-wing Ba'athists who were conservative in outlook and who tended also to be anti-Egyptian, anti-Communist and prepared, in the main, to follow fairly middle of the road policies, and the "Palace Group", most of them younger men with more revolutionary ideas, who would have liked to establish their rule on as broad (and so not exclusively Ba'athist) a basis as possible, and who were opposed to a party monopoly.

8. In such a coalition it was only a matter of time before one of the groups moved against the other. The Ba'athists were the more experienced and better prepared, and less than a fortnight after the *coup* the inhabitants of Baghdad were made aware, by the presence in the streets of the tanks of the 10 Armoured Brigade, that a new upheaval was taking place. The Prime Minister meanwhile had been invited to the Presidential Palace, and was there arrested and flown out immediately to Morocco. The Minister of Defence, who was visiting Iraqi units in Jordan, was similarly arrested and deported to Rome. It is believed that the driving force behind the new *coup* was that very experienced intriguer Saleh Mehdi Ammash, assisted by Abdel Kerim Abdel Sattar al Sheikhli, who became Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new Government. The *coup*, however, owed much of its success to the defection of the Commander of the Republican Guard who deserted his friends in the "Palace Group" and went over to the Ba'ath.

9. Both *coups* demonstrated very clearly the present importance of the Guard and, to a lesser extent, of the Baghdad garrison, in the making and unmaking of Governments. The former had been greatly expanded, pampered and heavily armed by Abdel Salam Aref, and it was his successor's refusal to follow the advice of the "Palace Group" which precipitated the *coup* of 17 July. Again, in the *coup* of 30 July, it was the attitude of the Guard, or rather of its Commander, which appears to have been decisive, and it would seem that as long as the Government can be certain of the loyalty of the Guard and of the garrison of Baghdad it can be fairly confident of remaining in power, particularly as long as its system of filtration at all levels in the armed forces continues to be effective.

IV. The Ba'ath Administration (July 1968-January 1970)

10. The Ba'ath, a pan-Arab party with a supra-national organisation, has nevertheless built up an elaborate structure on a cell system (see Annex B) typical of a clandestine minority group, which it has indeed been for much of its existence. As a result it has evolved as an isolated, doctrinaire élite with little popular standing, and when it has come to power it has displayed the weaknesses of its development in its lack of the common touch and of the essentials of administrative efficiency. Recently, with greater confidence and sense of stability, there have been signs that much of this weakness is on the way to being overcome.

11. As far as policy is concerned the party is committed nominally to following the dictates of the International Command, but in fact the Regional Commands

have a good deal of autonomy and, both in Syria and even more so in Iraq, have followed independent policies imposed by local conditions and dictated by personal ambitions. Moreover, by the time the Iraqi Ba'ath returned to power in July 1968 the old International Command had ceased to exist, though that part of it which remained loyal to Michel Aflaq still commanded some respect in Iraq. The régime itself is representative of one wing only of Iraqi Ba'athism, although undoubtedly the much most powerful, reinforced as it has been by opportunist defections which have left the Left-wing Ba'ath weaker than ever.

12. The framing and direction of policy is in the hands of the Regional Command Council, a body of 13 Ba'athists, only 5 of whom hold office in the Government (see Annex A). The programme which is sketched out for itself was to some extent concerned with consolidation of its own internal position. The usual tribute was paid to pan-Arabism and the need to co-operate with other Arab countries, the UAR in particular, but the main emphasis was laid on the need to allot key posts in the Armed Forces, Police, Intelligence and Civil Service to loyal party members. All services were to be purged of their non-Ba'ath elements and steps taken to indoctrinate sympathetic and malleable material. Further emphasis was laid on the dominant role of the Command Council, security in particular being kept under its direct control.

13. As regards relations with other parties efforts were to be made to secure the co-operation of the Nasserists, Nationalists and certain Communist groups, with a view to forming a National Front and broadening the basis of its support. From any such Front, however, such religio-political movements as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Front were to be excluded, and every effort was to be made to undermine and destroy rival Ba'ath groups. Finally, a "positive attitude" was to be adopted towards imperialist-inspired plots against the régime. One mistake which was not repeated was that of openly re-establishing the National Guard, the excesses of which had contributed so much to the unpopularity of the 1963 régime. Propaganda was to be used with discretion and party members were to be given suitable posts where they might make their political influence felt, but emphasis was laid on the need to avoid alarming the people.

14. In foreign policy the programme followed predictable lines, support, as noted above, for pan-Arabism, restricted however, to "progressive" countries only, military action against Israel and support for guerilla organisations, strengthening of relations with Communist countries, continuance of the struggle against "Western imperialism", "Zionism" and "reaction", and the promotion and consolidation of Arab interests in the Persian Gulf.

15. At home the régime pledged itself to bring the oil companies under national control, to settle the Kurdish problem, to expedite agrarian reform and to expand irrigation, in all of which both at home and abroad, the Iraqi Command followed fairly closely time-honoured party doctrines of social reform, secularism, anti-Zionism and anti-imperialism and promotion of Arab unity with, however, a greater slant to the Left than might have been expected. The régime prides itself on being in "the Vanguard of progressive Arab forces" and as such tends to follow extreme Socialist policies.

16. It is to be remembered also that many in the régime are Ba'athists for opportunist reasons only. They are preponderantly Sunnis from central Iraq who have little political sensibility, only a vague idea of how to achieve their aims, and little interest in maintaining such links as still exist with the rump of the International Command, which moved its headquarters from Beirut to Baghdad shortly after the coup of 17 July. Although opposed in theory to military autocracy, they are many

of them ex-officers who have had to rely on the army both to bring them to power and to keep them there. To a great extent, therefore, they have to adapt their policies to the views of the senior officers among their supporters, and as suggested in paragraph 9 above, the attitude of the Republican Guard and of the Baghdad garrison is all-important.

The régime in action

17. Despite a number of attempts to create a National Front and so improve its popular image the régime so far has had little success, largely because of its own lack of enthusiasm for genuine co-operation with any other group, and to the one-sidedness of the terms offered. The main stumbling block to agreement with the Communists is the refusal of the Ba'ath to agree to the reinstatement of numbers of Communist officers in the armed forces, nor have the Communists forgotten their persecution at the hands of the National Guard in 1963. Efforts to bring in some of the smaller and less important groups such as the Arab Socialist Movement or the Socialist Unity Party, have not been any more successful, largely because once again, though to a lesser extent than in 1963, the Ba'ath has shown itself reluctant to make concessions.

18. It appears also to have had no great success in winning support in the armed forces, especially in those units on active service in Jordan and in the north, mainly because of the severity of its anti-Ba'athist purges, and promotion of junior pro-Ba'athists over the heads of senior and more competent officers. So far however it has been successful in countering the development of opposition. It has destroyed even further the efficiency of the Civil Service by placing Ba'athists in many posts of importance regardless of qualifications, and has settled, rather more discreetly than in the past, a number of old scores by indiscriminate arrest and confinement of Nasserists, Communists, Left-wing Ba'athists and Islamic Front sympathisers, and which in one case at least does not appear to have stopped short of political murder.

19. The early months in power were devoted mainly to the consolidation of its position by methods the calculated severity of which may have produced the results expected of them but which in the long run must have added much to the unpopularity of the régime. It also showed intolerance and inability to compromise in its treatment of minorities and foreign, mainly Western, interests (the expulsion of the European staff of the Jesuit Hikma University is only one case in point); it has lived up to Shi'i apprehensions that no concessions were to be expected from a Sunni, doctrinaire and militarily-dominated régime, and its efforts to deal with the Kurdish problem have not been successful. In domestic affairs it has achieved rather more but, as remarked above, the efficiency of the Civil Service has been depreciated further by the appointment of party members to posts for which they have no qualifications.

20. In foreign affairs the party has veered to the Left with its financial and aid agreements with the Soviet *bloc*,^(*) its harassment of the oil companies, its recognition of East Germany and its persecution of former political leaders on charges of collaboration with imperialism. It favours an all-out military assault on Israel under a Unified Arab Command, but is on bad, or at the best hardly cordial, terms with the other States involved, the UAR, Jordan and Syria. The party would like,

(*) Recent examples are the sulphur deal with Poland, the agreement between INOC and Machinexport (USSR) for supply of oil equipment and technical help; the loan of \$70 million from the USSR for development of the North Rumeila oilfield, and the \$84 million credit from East Germany for industrial projects.

however, to play a greater part in Arab affairs than it does now, and there are signs that it is attempting to build up its influence through party members in its Embassies in Kuwait, the Sudan, Syria and some other Arab countries, particularly in the Persian Gulf States, where it sees itself as the champion of Arabism against the ambitions and encroachments of Iran. While only moderately interested in the Persian Gulf the régime on the whole supports the creation of the Union of Arab Emirates, though unlikely to tolerate for long the existence of the "feudal reactionary" Sheikhdoms which would compose it.

21. Not only is the Ba'ath an unpopular minority régime, it is also a most divided one. Internal rivalry appears to centre round the two Deputy Prime Ministers, General Saleh Mehdi Ammash, who is also Minister of the Interior, and General Hardan Abdel Ghaffar al Takriti, the Minister of Defence. They are both of them old hands at political intrigue, but whereas Ammash favours rapprochement with the Syrian Ba'ath and extreme measures, both against "reaction" abroad and opposition at home, and is supported by the Left-wing and more extreme members of the party such as Abdel Kerim Abdel Sattar al Sheikhli, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Abdullah Sallum al Samarraï, Minister of Culture and National Guidance, Takriti, a highly skilled and opportunist tactician, with the bulk of the Ba'athist officers in the armed forces behind him, and the support of the President, is inclined, for his own purposes, to follow less radical and more traditional Ba'ath policies. So far the two men have been evenly matched, but Takriti, despite support in the army, is mistrusted on account of the part he is alleged to have played in the fall of the régime in 1963, and it is noteworthy that he is not a member of the Regional Command Council. Recently, however, Saddam Hussein al Takriti has improved his position on appointment as Vice-Chairman of the Regional Command Council in which he is well placed to succeed should anything happen to the President.

V. Conclusions

22. It must be concluded that this is a Government of few strengths and not a few weaknesses, one of whose main concerns has been to protect itself against summary overthrow. No régime thus concerned with its own survival is likely to govern well or to relax the methods by which it retains control. In this the present régime is probably no worse or better than some of its predecessors, and the fact remains that by one means or another it has maintained itself in power for some 18 months and is showing signs of finding time to tackle some of the country's more pressing problems. The economy is in better shape than it was, and by Iraqi standards the Government is giving proof of some stability, but it has yet to secure the support of other political groups, and requires to show a much greater measure of toleration in a country which, apart from other party differences, contains sizeable minorities in the Kurds, the Shi'is and the Christians, and to compromise to a far greater extent than it has shown itself ready to do, before it can claim to have any real degree of general support.

23. As remarked above it is a highly élitist organisation which has few grass roots. Its system of recruitment and its structure set a premium on isolation and secrecy, characteristics which, however admirable and desirable they may be in opposition and under suppression, are no longer so in office. It is government by a clique of on the whole uncompromising, utterly determined and often ruthless men who have not hesitated to use violence to suppress any suspicion of opposition. Such methods, supplemented as they are by purges, cross-postings, grass root indoctrination and infiltration of the armed forces and civil service are calculated to keep potential plotters at bay and in such a state of fear, disorganisation and

uncertainty as to make the successful mounting of a *coup* improbable. The other side of the coin is that the régime has tended to withdraw even more upon itself and to become even more inaccessible in its search for anonymity in the exercise of power. The changes in the Constitution which took place in November 1969 have meant that the Regional Command of the party have virtually taken over as the Government of the country and it looks as if the door has closed on thoughts of co-operation with any other group.

24. In Iraq it has developed certain typical national characteristics. The fanatic streak always evident in its doctrine has developed into partisan violence in the tough climate of Iraqi politics, and it has become, even more so than in Syria, the façade for an authoritarian and opportunist military group for whom Ba'athism is largely a convenient political label, and whose nationalism is a contradiction of its pan-Arabism. Even less than in Syria does it rest on popular support, and it appears to have appealed most strongly to the bourgeois strata of Iraqi society, the middle class army officers and professional men, lawyers, politicians, school teachers and university students. It is thus the party of a very small segment of Iraqi society. Prior to 1963 it was of no great importance and its behaviour in power served only to deepen popular dislike and distrust, which the present régime has done little to dissipate. The gap between the people and the party, between its own ideology and police methods of rule is yet to be bridged. So long, however, as it can command military support of the sort suggested in paragraph 9 above it is likely to remain in power for what could be quite some time.

Middle East Section,


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Foreign and Commonwealth Office.


ANNEX A.

THE REGIONAL COMMAND COUNCIL IN IRAQ

Ahmed Hassan al Bakr, President and Prime Minister.
Saddam Hussein al Takriti, Vice-Chairman of RCC.
Saleh Mehdi Ammash, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior.
Abdel Kerim Abdel Sattar al Sheikhli, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Abdullah Sallum al Samarraï, Minister of Culture and Information.
Izzat Mustapha, Minister of Health.
Salah Omar Ali.
Abdel Khaliq al Samarraï.
Murtadha al Hadithi.
Izzat al Duri.
Samir Abdel Aziz al Najim.
Naim Haddad.
Taha Jizrawi.

CONFIDENTIAL**ANNEX B****THE STRUCTURE OF THE BA'ATH PARTY**

1. Elected by International Congress of the party.
2. Elected by Regional Congresses.
3. Secretaries of Departments and party nominees.
4. Selected members of Divisions.
5. 3-6 Area members.
6. Selected Section leaders.
7. Cell leaders.
8. 3-5 members.



A. THE ARAB WORLD AND ISRAEL

Iraqi Ba'th Party 10th National Congress Statement

Baghdad home service in Arabic 18.00 GMT 13.4.70

Excerpts from political statement of the Ba'th Party's 10th National Congress in Baghdad from 1st to 10th March 1970, read by the assistant secretary general of the Ba'th Party National Command, Shibli al-Aysami (broadcast live or from a recording):

Masses of our fighting Arab nation, the national congresses of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party throughout its fighting march have been major halts at which experience in revolutionary action has been pooled and from which the incentive for intellectual, political and social development of the Arab revolution has surged forward. At these congresses the outlines of the scientific view of Arab reality and the laws of the radical development of that reality within the framework of liberation and progressive revolution in the Third World and the socialist revolution as a whole has become clear.

With this in mind the 10th National Congress met in Baghdad from 1st and 10th March. It stressed the need to solve the Kurdish question in Northern Iraq in a manner responding to the human dimensions of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party's national concept and to the requirements of the unity between the Arab and Kurdish masses in the fight to achieve their national liberation aims. These aims unite them in one rank against the imperialist-Zionist and reactionary alliance...

(1) The relationship between ideology, strategy and tactics: The Congress defined this relationship. It differentiated between the Party's overall strategy for building a socialist, democratic and unified Arab society - that is fulfilling the aims of unity, freedom and socialism - and the strategy of stages. The strategy of stages deals with issues of national destiny and requires direct action within the framework of the general aims of the Arab revolution, such as the Palestine question and the colonialist invasion of the Arabian Gulf, creating forms of action for unity and liquidating the remnants of feudalism, the bourgeoisie and backwardness - all within the framework of the concept of dialogue between the national factor and the social factor...

(2) Requirements of the present stage: The Congress defined the present stage as the stage of confrontation of the challenge and of preparation for the coming battle against the Zionist and imperialist aggression. It regarded the present stage as a transition to a new level of intellect, action, planning and execution and of demonstrating revolutionary maturity and total cohesion of the national liberation struggle and the social class struggle...

In its analysis of the present Arab fight the Congress stressed that national liberation and social class constituted two factors of one reality to which the Arab revolution aspired. The Congress concluded that the analysis of social class in the development of Arab revolutionary action before the 1967 setback confirmed the political analysis and the analysis of the intellectual and ideological currents of that stage. The analyses showed that 5th June was the end of minority leadership of the bourgeoisie and the beginning of leadership by the revolutionary masses, that is the stage of organised, planned strategic cohesion between the masses, who believe in the Arab revolutionary ideology, and the leading revolutionary forces, who are qualified to play through the National Front, at the Arab homeland level, the leading role of the Arab fight.

The Congress also established that the existing Arab political regimes could not gain the confidence of the Arab masses until they rose to the new level required by the present revolutionary stage; discarded the negative attitudes of the previous stage - acceptance of division, domination of regional mentality, bureaucratic methods, combat of revolutionary partisanship, support for the armed struggle in theory only without giving it the opportunity to develop into a real war of popular liberation, stopping at the limits of verbal support for the working class without preparing for its struggle, for conditions for its growth, or for its serious participation in the leadership; and until they abandoned the use of public rejection of international surrender solutions as a means of covering their defeatist positions.

The Congress also declared that the triumph of national over regional mentality, and logic and the achievement of the strategy of unity, were the main aims of the Arab fight, in addition to Party action on formulas and practices for forming a front, unleashing the effectiveness of the working masses, supporting fida'i action and armed struggle, and rejecting solutions aimed at liquidating the Palestine question...

The Congress concluded that the reply to the regional trend based on division and disunity should be made through revolutionary unity in which the national factor was united with the democratic and socialist concepts, and not through a unity based on autocracy or domination, nor on a unity which embraced contradictions...

(3) On the Party level, the Congress decided the following:

(a) To develop the struggle and class structure of the Party so that it responds to the requirements of the present revolutionary stage and so that fida'i action and armed struggle become a major axis in the life of its members.

(b) To intensify and strengthen self-criticism to a new level of Party action and revolutionary spirit, and to pay attention to Party education and liberate it from the intellectual, political and organisational mistakes of the previous stage.

(c) To pay serious attention to Party membership orientations and to create the conditions for the development of theoretical and practical Party action, so as to achieve unity of Party personality and strengthen the Party's struggle and ethic which is distinguished by an all-embracing outlook.

(d) To define the Party's attitude to Ba'thist rule in any country by creating a balanced outlook between the independence of the Party on the one hand and the circumstance of the regime in that country and the protection of the regime against any plots.

(4) In the national sphere, the Congress defined the Party's role as follows:

(a) To co-ordinate fully political strategy and the Arab revolution ideology and to oppose all attempts to deviate from or fall below this.

(b) To regard the achievement of unity as an effective factor in moving to the stage of serious confrontation with the Zionist imperialist aggression. This unity, in addition to uniting the political, economic and cultural systems, must pay attention to unifying the Arab revolution's forces within the framework of front and national action, which would lead the Arab masses in accordance with a political programme defining the needs of the confrontation at all levels.

(c) To turn to the people and reveal to them the difficulties obstructing the march of the unity struggle and from action so that the Arab masses will throw their weight behind the Party's march.

(d) To concentrate Party efforts on the Palestine question and fida'i action and to draw attention to the other problems, such as the imperialist reactionary plan in the Arabian Gulf, and to make intellectual, practical, political, information and popular efforts to project it in order to awaken the Arab masses throughout the Arab homeland to this imminent danger, to prepare to meet and overcome it, and to steer the Arabian Gulf States and Amirates towards a serious union, which is the minimum required to meet this danger.

(e) To mobilise all the Party's powers on a national level to support the Party's regime in Iraq and to strengthen and enrich its experience.

(5) On the political level:

(a) to adopt serious and swift action to change the outlines of Arab reality by bringing about the objective conditions to confront the Zionist-imperialist alliance by constant work for unity in its progressive form, and a comprehensive reappraisal of the structure of the Arab reality, creation of intellectual and ideological readiness to link complete Arab life to the requirements of long term confrontation, and to transform the economy, policy and education and daily life into a means for aiding the orientation of the Arab struggle towards the battle.

(b) To stress dependence on the strategy of popular liberation war which was approved by the Ninth National Congress and to consider all its requirements for the confrontation in the formulation of policy, in the economy and in education - the natural channel to achieve a basic, complete and profound revolution in contemporary Arab life aimed at destroying division, backwardness and class exploitation.

(c) To create objective circumstances for the unity of the Arab revolutionary forces in an all-embracing revolutionary action programme aimed at unleashing the effectiveness of the Arab masses and placing in their hands the reins of the battle by setting up a progressive national front at Arab homeland level.

(d) To regard the Arab masses as the means of revolution and the aim and the possessor of the interest of liberation and consequently always to look to the masses and mobilise them to engage in the battle, especially since hollow formulas have failed to represent the minimum effort required for the joint Arab confrontation and action.

(6) The Palestine question and fida'i action.

(a) To regard the Palestine revolution as the centre of the Arab revolution and to destroy every deviationist trend starting from a regional concept or from an opportunist attitude which aims to shatter the unity of dialogue between the Arab revolution and the Palestine revolution.

(b) To work to implement the strategy of the popular liberation war by strengthening fida's action and popular resistance in the occupied area and ensuring all their political, material and moral requirements.

(c) To strengthen relations between the Party and the fida's organisations through the Palestine Unified Command and on the basis of fraternal struggle among the Arab revolutionary forces.

(e) To support all efforts aimed at achieving unified fida'i action under the leadership of the revolutionary intellect.

(f) To reject all calls to surrender and to resist all attempts to strangle and contain the Palestine revolution and liquidate the Palestine problem.

(g) To publicise the nature of the Palestine battle, expose the physical link between imperialism and Zionism, and strengthen the ties of friendship between the Palestine revolution and all progressive and liberation movements in the world.

(7) On the Iraqi Region: To achieve the desired new pattern after 5th June - to turn the Iraqi Region into an Arab revolutionary force and to put the Region's resources at the service of national strategy - the Congress has defined the main aims of the Iraqi Region's rule as follows:

(a) To solve regional problems in the light of the Resistance strategy against the Zionist-imperialist-reactionary alliance. The Congress stressed that the peaceful democratic solution of the Kurdish question on the basis of self-government within Iraqi unity to achieve the best conditions for co-operation and collaboration between both Arab and Kurdish nationalities must be regarded as the foremost Party achievement. This will enable the armed forces and its economic and manpower resources to be devoted to confronting the Zionist danger and will close the road to imperialist-reactionary plots in the area.

(b) To achieve deep revolutionary achievements that will lead to radical changes in production to bring about the necessary conditions for entry into the socialist transformation phase.

(c) To regard the Palestine revolution as the focal point in the Iraqi Region's policy; to introduce in theory and in practice unity and popular and regular armed struggle into every house, factory, school and barracks, and to shape the individual, family, village and town according to the requirements of the confrontation.

(d) To view the struggle for unity as a road to liberation and to regard the fight for Palestine as the sound path to a unity that will mend all effects of previous experiments. The path for unity and the path for liberation are one.

(e) To achieve a progressive national front on both regional and national levels.

(f) To achieve an information, cultural and social revolution that will free Arab life from division and chauvinism inconsistent with humanitarian national relations, concepts and traditions which hinder the confrontation of the enemy in a scientific and revolutionary way.

(g) Constantly to take the initiative at official and popular levels to create suitable conditions for unified action.

(h) To invite Arab regimes and popular Arab organisations to participate in a programme that will revive the Arab masses' aspirations and make them feel confident of victory, once Arab revolutionary resources come under its banner, and will provide these regimes and organisations with firm revolutionary criteria for self-criticism.

(i) To support every Arab revolutionary upsurge whatever its identity and to use every possibility to protect it from any suppression.

(j) To discover the dangers in the areas against which imperialism is plotting, such as the Arabian Gulf and Northern and Southern Yemen, and to support them by drawing up a strategy to protect the Gulf from imperialist plots.

(8) In the international field: The Party role is to confront international attempts to liquidate the Palestine question through a solution to the crisis created by the 5th June war. This will be done by daring and decisive confrontation that will ensure the achievement of political objectives in the present phase:

- (a) To foil the schemes against the future of the question, which constitute a form of international bargaining at the expense of the Arab nation's interests and destiny.
- (b) To establish open and closer relations with the socialist camp.
- (c) To create an informed public opinion aware of the true Arab revolutionary stand in defence of Arab existence and destiny and as a struggle against a serious danger menacing mankind's future.
- (d) To give warning against the Zionist-imperialist-reactionary alliance, the actual dimensions of the plotting against the Arab homeland, and the nature of the strategic alliance between the USA and Israel.
- (e) To win true friends for the Arab revolution who will understand its objectives and appreciate its important role in world revolution.
- (f) To deepen the effect of Arab resistance in Palestine and to expand the framework of international official and popular support and assistance to the resistance.
- (g) To diminish the effect of Zionist propaganda and limit Zionist plotting against world public opinion.
- (h) To support national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and to establish objective relations with them.
- (i) To have deep and organised receptivity to world socialist experiments, to interact with them and to benefit from their experience, particularly those which have passed through circumstances similar to those of the Arab nation.
- (j) To demonstrate the Party's presence at official and popular level in the international field by expanding and deepening contacts with various progressive forces and regimes; to consider earnestly the establishment of normal relations with them; to attend conferences and pay visits; and to invite delegations and take the initiative in preparing conferences of progressive forces.
- (k) To enter into dialogues with socialist parties in socialist States to explain the Party's ideas and the objectives of the Arab revolution, and to create an atmosphere of mutual understanding for the Arab cause. This will be possible through the open policy which has begun to show in the attitude of the Soviet Union and the socialist States to the Party since the 17th July revolution in Iraq.
- (l) To take an interest in progressive world public opinion; to establish friendly relations with progressive parties and organisations in the West so these relations can help to expose the imperialist policies of pro-Zionist Western Governments to their own people; and to refute Zionist propaganda, explain Arab rights and the dimensions of the Arab cause, check the effect of Zionist propaganda on Western public opinion, and create a positive atmosphere in which objective and humanitarian views will overcome passive sentiments created by Zionist plans to isolate Western public opinion from issues of the Arab revolution.
- (m) To strengthen relations between Arab vocational organisations and trade unions and international organisations. This constitutes an important factor to thwart the effect of Zionist propaganda. It also contributes to mutual understanding of world revolutionary questions and develops a constructive revolutionary criticism necessary to remedy mistakes and defects which penetrate the Arab revolutionary action before they become serious.
- (n) To declare that Party policy and its international attitudes are now based on a clearly defined criterion - the attitude of others to the Palestine Arab question.

Masses of the Arab nation, the 10th National Congress adopted a number of resolutions and recommendations on the implementation of Party and political strategic action contained in this statement, and on organisational issues to ensure the development of organisational aims to the level qualifying them to assume the burdens of the phase and to implement the necessary strategy.

The congress elected a new National Command and concluded its work. The Party will continue its struggle in line with the Congress resolutions and recommendations and in the light of the approved strategy.

The Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, which has been fighting for 30 years and which has succeeded in overcoming its mistakes and setbacks and in withstanding plots and subversive attempts, gives its pledge to the Arab masses to remain with them on the path of unyielding, continuous struggle until unity, freedom and socialism are achieved.

Cairo Radio Attack on UK Policy

Cairo home service in Arabic 18.30 GMT 15.4.70

Text of 'We and the World' comment:

Under pressure from the controlling groups in the British House of Commons, the Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, was compelled to reveal some of the flaws in Britain's Middle East policy. News agencies carried differing texts of Stewart's statement in the House, but they agreed on three [sic] points:

(1) Stewart agrees to slight alterations to the so-called borders which existed between the Arabs and Israel before 4th June 1967 and that these alterations are dictated by Israel's security.

(2) Stewart personally approves of direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs but, because such negotiations are impossible at present, a substitute must be found.

(3) Stewart regrets the Israeli air raid on Be'er al-Baqer in which Israel killed 32 children, but he coupled this with regret over the Swiss aircraft incident.

(4) Stewart deems it necessary to adhere to the cease-fire until an agreement is reached.

With these three [sic] points in his statement in the House of Commons, Michael Stewart comes close to the US attitude on the Middle East; he in fact repeats the words of the Rogers plan. Stewart also reveals a great contradiction between (?this attitude) and the British resolution approved by the Security Council in November 1967. This resolution begins by stipulating withdrawal from all territories occupied after 5th June. Stewart thus exposes the British role in the four-power talks and its complete prejudice in favour of Israel.


Although the fog has begun to clear and British policy is becoming apparent, we must ask whether this good visibility will reveal anything new on what has been said about London's close ties with Tel Aviv. Despite all Britain's attempts to hide the facts, there is for example the question of the British arms deals - the Chieftain and Centurion tanks - with Israel. Britain has so far declined to confirm or deny these deals on the pretext that it is not in the habit of announcing anything about military deals.

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BRITISH EMBASSY,
BAGHDAD.



Ente-Tenn File
6 then to :-

Mr. Mansour Long
Arabian Land.

Dear Peter,

Ba'ath Party Congress

Please refer to my letter 2/8 of 28 February. The long awaited resolutions of the Tenth Congress of the International Ba'ath Party were published here on 13 April. I enclose a summary of the Manifesto issued by the Congress with the complete text of the resolutions passed. I make no apologies for the length of this enclosure which lays claim to being the basis of the Party's strategy for the immediate future. Although the Conference is stated to have been held in Baghdad between 1 March and 10 March, it has been suggested that this was merely to protect delegates from other countries and that in fact the meeting reported in my letter under reference was the full International Congress. If this was so the attempt at disguise was not very successful since the Beirut press, when it finally caught on, reported the Congress as being held in the second half of February.

2. On several points the resolutions of the Congress add little to the known politics of the Ba'ath Party. The ever present theme is, of course, Palestine. The Congress expresses its complete support for the commando organisations and in particular the new Unified Command (paragraph 6), rejects any compromise settlement (paragraph 8(i)) and declares its aim of acquiring wider international backing for the Arab cause (paragraph 8(vi))

3. Paragraph 7 deals with the Ba'athist regime in Iraq. It contains a resolution supporting the principle of a National Front and, as we had been led to expect, the party's fiat for the settlement with the Kurds. Generally, however, the Congress fails to deal satisfactorily with the crucial problem of reconciling Ba'ath ideology with practice. This problem is recognised in the opening paragraphs of the Manifesto in which it is stated that political realities require the Ba'ath in power to implement party ideology in stages. However the resolutions in paragraph 7 seem to give no order of priorities and do not seem to be intended as a stage by stage programme. The Iraqi Ba'ath will therefore presumably deal with this problem as they have in the past - by ad hoc implementation of party doctrine wherever and whenever feasible.

4. It is interesting to find "the awakening of the Arab masses" in the Gulf placed almost on a par with Palestine (4 (iv)) and picked out as a particular responsibility of the Iraqi regime (7 (x)). On the more general level, the Ba'ath remain committed to exporting their revolution (paragraph 5) and to supporting revolutionary movements in the non-Arab world (8 (viii)).

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

/5.

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5. On relations with the Soviet bloc the Ba'ath state their policy of taking the initiative in establishing the closest possible ties with the Socialist Community (8 (ii)), attempting to assimilate accumulated Socialist wisdom (8 (ix)) and embarking on dialogues with Socialist parties in Socialist countries (8 (xi)). These resolutions, in particular paragraph 8 (ix) appear to reflect an attempt to exploit the friendship of Socialist countries without any commitment to communism itself.

6. There is little evidence in the Manifesto to support press reports from Beirut that the Congress moved leftwards towards a rapprochement with Hafiz al Assad and the Syrian Ba'ath (see McKearney's letter 2/8 of 20 March to Strachan in Amman). There is of course much talk of Arab unity but no mention of Syria. This is understandable but does suggest that if a pro-Syrian swing took place it was not nearly as pronounced as al-Hayat would have us believe. No announcement has been made here of the result of the elections to the International Command. For what it is worth I am enclosing al-Hayat's version of the results which you may not have seen.

Yours

Mike

(M. K. Jenner)

c.c. Chanceries:

Beirut

Amman

Cairo

Bahrain Residency

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Summary of the Manifesto issued by the Tenth
National Conference of the Ba'ath Party with
a complete text of the Resolutions Passed

1. On Relations between Ideology, Strategy and Tactics

The basic aim of the conference was to define this relationship, in particular the problem of reconciling the strategic long term aim of achieving a united democratic socialist Arab society with the political and economic realities in individual Arab countries and the Arab nation as a whole. The conference stressed that political realities should not be ignored and would require that party ideology be implemented by degrees.

2. The Necessities of the Current Stage

The current stage of the revolution was therefore a transitional one, in which the goals could be defined as follows:

a) The rejection of regional fragmentation and the building of Arab unity in particular unity on the Palestine issue and in support of commando action.

b) The preparation of a strategic doctrine on which revolutionary unity might be based. The conference noted that the catastrophe of 1967 was the direct result of lack of unity and in particular the existence of petit bourgeois leadership in many parts of the Arab world. Arab political institutions could not gain the confidence of the Arab people so long as they did not measure up to basic revolutionary aims.

3. On the Party level, the Convention passed resolutions on the following:

(i) To develop the struggle and class structure of the party so as to meet the needs of the current revolutionary stage and to make commando action and armed struggle the main axis of the life of its members.

(ii) To deepen and consolidate self-criticism so as to reach a new level of Party work, revolutionary outlook, and attention to party education with the purpose of saving the party from the ideological, political and organisational errors that marked their earlier term of office.

(iii) To devote serious attention to Party education and to develop Party work in both theory and practice with the object of realising
/unity



unity of the Party personality and enhancing its struggle and ethical character with a comprehensive scientific outlook.

(iv) To define the Party's position on any régime it might come to have in any given country by (a) striking a balance between the independent character of the Party and (b) taking into consideration the circumstances of such a régime with due care to protecting it against conspiracies.

4. On the pan-Arab (nationalist) level, the Convention passed resolutions on the following:

(i) To achieve real links between political strategy and the ideological framework of the Arab revolution and to oppose all endeavours to deviate from or fall short of this goal.

(ii) To consider the achievement of unity as the effective factor in reacting to the stage of serious confrontation with the Zionist-imperialistic aggression. Such unity must, in addition to unifying political, economic and cultural institutions, take care to unify the forces of Arab revolution within the framework of a nationalist front capable of leading the Arab masses in accordance with a political programme defining the requirements of the confrontation on all levels.

(iii) To refer to the people and keep them informed of the difficulties that might confront the advance of the struggle for unity and confrontation so that the Arab masses may put their weight behind the Party.

(iv) Focusing the Party's endeavours on the Palestine issue and commando action while at the same time drawing attention to other problems such as the imperialistic-reactionary schemings in the Arab Gulf. Every effort should be made (a) in the fields of ideology, politics, information and popular work to classify those schemings and awaken the Arab masses, everywhere in the Arab homeland, to this menacing danger; (b) to prepare to meet and overcome it and (c) to prompt the Gulf states and principalities to achieve real unity which meets the minimum requirements of confronting the danger in question.

(v) Mobilising the Party's entire energies on a nationalist (pan-Arab) level towards supporting the Party's rule in Iraq and deepening and enriching its experiment.

5. On the political level, the Convention passed resolutions on the following:

(i) To undertake serious and speedy work to change the features of Arab realities with the object of achieving objective conditions
/necessary



necessary for confronting the Zionist-imperialistic alliance. This is to be achieved by tireless endeavours for the realisation of unity in its progressive substance. The view of the edifice of Arab conditions is to be totally revised and a mental and psychological preparedness to link the Arab life fully with the necessities of long-term confrontation is to be created. Economy, politics and every-day life should all be turned to advantage with the object of directing the Arab struggle in the battlefield.

(ii) To emphasise the adoption of the strategy of the national liberation war previously endorsed at the 9th National Convention. The requirements of that strategy (including the creation of the policy of confrontation, the economy of confrontation, the school of confrontation) should be considered as the natural key to the realisation of a full-fledged, drastic and deep revolution in the contemporary Arab life, all in a manner totally removing fragmentation, backwardness and class exploitation.

(iii) To create objective conditions for uniting Arab revolutionary forces around a comprehensive programme of revolutionary work which will help to release the effectiveness of the Arab masses and place the reins of the battle in their hands. This is to be achieved by creating the progressive nationalist front on pan-Arab levels.

(iv) The Arab masses are considered the instruments as well as the objective of the Revolution and the one element which has a real stake in liberation. Consequently the advance should always be in the direction of the masses, towards mobilising them for the battle, all the more so after the formulas coming down from above have proved their impotence and their utter failure to attain to the minimum levels required for the confrontation and for joint Arab action.

6. On the Palestine issue and commando action, the Convention passed resolutions on the following:

(i) To consider the Palestine Revolution as the main centre of gravity for the Arab Revolution and to eliminate all deviationist tendencies arising from local concepts or opportunistic stands aimed at cracking the dialectical unity of the Arab Revolution and the Palestine Revolution.

(ii) To endeavour to carry out the strategy of the war of national liberation and armed struggle by bolstering the Palestine Commando work and popular resistance in the occupied territories and assuring them of all political, material and moral requirements.

(iii) To foster relations between the Party and commando organisations through the Unified Palestine Leadership on the basis of comradeship in struggle between Arab revolutionary forces.

/(iv)



- (iv) To support all endeavours that seek the realisation of the slogan of the unity of commando action under the leadership of revolutionary ideology.
- (v) To reject all policies smacking of capitulation and to resist all attempts to contain the Palestine Revolution and liquidate the Palestine issue.
- (vi) To spread understanding of the battle fought in Palestine, uncovering the organic association between imperialism and Zionism and fostering the ties of friendship between the Palestine Revolution and progressive movements of liberation the world over.

7. On the Iraqi Territory

The convention has drawn up the broadlines of the advance of the régime in the territory of Iraq in the following manner, with the object of attaining the new pattern required in the post-June 5 era - i.e. by converting the territory of Iraq into a revolutionary Arab force and committing the country's potentialities to serving nationalist strategy:

- (i) Solving the territory's problems in the light of the strategy of confronting the Zionist-imperialistic-reactionary alliance. The Convention stressed that the proclamation of a peaceful, democratic settlement to the Kurdish issue on the basis of self-rule within the framework of Iraqi unity and in a manner assuring the best conditions for cooperation and solidarity between the Arab and Kurdish nationalities, should be in the forefront of the Party's accomplishments so as to release its armed forces and its economic and human energies for the confrontation of the Zionist danger and to undermine imperialistic and reactionary conspiracies in the region.
- (ii) Achieving deep revolutionary accomplishments leading to drastic transformations in production relationships along with the necessary conditions for embarking upon the stage of socialist transformation.
- (iii) Considering the Palestine revolution as the centre of gravity for the policy of the territory of Iraq and getting the strategy of unity and of popular and regular armed struggle (both in conscience and in practice) to enter every home, factory, school and barrack and shape up the life of the individual, the family, the village and the city in the light of the requirements of confrontation.
- (iv) Viewing struggle for unity as laying the path to liberation and looking upon the struggle waged in Palestine as the right way to a type of unity correcting all the consequences of the preceding experiment. This is because the road of unity and the road of liberation are inseparable.



- (v) Building the progressive national front on both the regional and nationalist levels (local and pan-Arab levels).
- (vi) Bringing about an information, cultural and social revolution disburdening Arab life of all residues of fragmentation and prejudices against the human nationalist associations and of all ideas and traditions disruptive to a scientific and revolutionary confrontation with the enemy.
- (vii) Ever taking initiatives on both official and popular levels to create a climate suitable for Arab unity.
- (viii) Inviting Arab institutions and Arab popular organisations to participate in a programme of action reviving the hopes of the Arab masses and creating among them confidence in victory once all revolutionary Arab potentialities are united under its banner. Such a programme of action would also provide a sharp revolutionary yardstick of criticism.
- (ix) Supporting every Arab revolutionary uprising and using all possibilities to protect it against encirclement and attack.
- (x) Uncovering the dangers converging on specific areas, the scenes of imperialistic conspiratorial activities, such as the Arab Gulf and North and South Yemen and endeavouring to give them every encouragement at the same time laying down a strategy for protecting the Gulf against imperialistic conspiracies.

8. On the International Level

On the international level the role of the Party is defined as the courageous, decisive and intelligent confrontation of world attempts to liquidate the Palestine issue under the pretext of resolving the crises emanating from the June 5 war, with a view to realising the political objectives at this stage, namely:

- (i) Foiling the attempts which would destroy the future of the issue and constitute a form of international compromise at the expense of the interest and destiny of the Arab Nation.
- (ii) Taking the initiative to establish the closest ties with the Socialist Community.
- (iii) Creating an educated public opinion capable of perceiving the reality of the Arab revolutionary attitude in defence of the Arab survival and destiny and in defiance of the serious danger threatening the destiny of humanity.

/(iv)



- (iv) Calling attention to the schemes of the Zionist imperialist-reactionary alliance, as well as to the real dimensions of the conspiracy against the Arab Homeland and to the nature of the strategic alliance between the US and Israel.
- (v) Acquiring real friends for the Arab Revolution capable of comprehending its objectives and appreciating the significance of the role undertaken in the field of world Revolution.
- (vi) Deepening the impact of Arab Resistance on the Palestine territories and expanding the framework of international backing and assistance both on the popular and official levels.
- (vii) Reducing the impact of the Zionist propaganda influence and Zionist scheming on world public opinion.
- (viii) Supporting the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America and establishing real links with them.
- (ix) Establishing extensive and organised assimilation of the socialist experiences in the world, cooperating with them and utilising their experience and expertise, especially those who have experienced conditions similar to those of the Arab Nation.
- (x) Emphasising the presence of the Party, on official and popular levels in international circles by means of expanding and deepening contacts with all progressive forces and régimes and devoting serious attention to the establishment of organised ties with them, and also displaying enthusiasm to attend conferences, conduct visits, extend invitations and take the initiative to prepare for the convention of progressive forces.
- (xi) Embarking on dialogues with the socialist parties in the socialist countries, with a view to explaining the Party's views and the objectives of the Arab Revolution, and bringing about an atmosphere of mutual understanding of the Arab question, by means of the candid attitudes of the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries towards the Party after the July 17 Revolution in Iraq.
- (xii) Devoting attention to the world progressive public opinion, and establishing friendly ties with progressive parties and organisations in the West, so as to assist in exposing the imperialist attitudes of the pro-Zionist governments in the West; exposing false Zionist propaganda, and explaining the Arab cause and the circumstances of the Arab case; curbing the influence of Zionist propaganda on world public opinion in the West; bringing about a positive atmosphere dominated by the objective and humane outlook rather than the passive sentimental attitudes created by Zionist schemes so as to insulate public opinion in the West from the issue of Arab Revolution.

/(xiii)



(xiii) Consolidating ties among the Arab vocational labour unions as well as the international organisations since such ties constitute a significant factor in foiling Zionist propaganda, and will help to bring about a mutual understanding of revolutionary issues the world over, and develop the constructive critical feeling required for dealing with the fallacies and ailments which penetrate into the Arab revolutionary movement before they become too acute.

(xiv) Emphasizing that the policy and attitudes of the Party depend at the current stage on a definite and clear-cut criterion, namely the attitudes of others vis-a-vis the Arab Palestine issue.

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Al-Hayat 2 March


Elections to the International Command of the Ba'ath
Party 1970.

Michel Aflaq	Secretary General
Shibli al Aisami	} - Syria
Elias Farah	
Dr. Zaid Haider	
Abdul Majid al Rifa'i	} - Lebanon
Nicola al Farzali	
Radhi Farhat	
Ahmad Hasan al Bakr	} - Iraq
Salih Mahdi Amash	
Abdul Karim al Shaikhli	
Muhammad Suleiman	Sudan
Kamal Fakhuri	Jordan
Umar Sahimi	Tunisia
Ali Ghannam	Saudi Arabia

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ARAB WORLD

Iraq



stant Secretary General of the leadership of the ruling Baath Party, gave the farmers what Baghdad's AL THAWRA, which speaks for the party, described yesterday as "lessons in revolutionary conduct." He said that every Iraqi has the right to be part of the revolution, and a member of "your leader and glorious party, the Arab Socialist Baath Party." He said that basically, the revolution was that of the peasants and workers, but that other Iraqis, be they civil servants or other employees, can join as well as long as they believe in the goals of the revolution.

The Foreign Element. The new Iraqi political campaign has been turned again at some of the foreign powers --and Iran has been mentioned openly, by Mr Takriti. Yesterday, there was a noticeable stepping-up of the anti-Teheran campaign in the Baghdad press. They reported what they described as "new arrests among the Kurds in Iran", and even talked about alleged explosions in Teheran itself.

This makes it appear as if Baghdad is again accusing neighbouring Persia of plots against the Iraqi regime. It will be recalled that Iran was accused of masterminding the abortive coup attempt last January to overthrow the Baathist Government in Baghdad.

The new apprehensions in Baghdad come at the time the regime is getting ready to celebrate the second anniversary of its advent to power. It will be recalled that the Baathists seized power on July 17th, 1968, after ousting the regime of former President Abdel Rahman Arif.

In fact, in his speech Wednesday, Mr Takriti referred to the "decadent and reactionary regime of Abdel Rahman Arif", and AL JUMHOURIA in its editorial yesterday said that the elements that had been removed with Arif appeared to be coming back behind all kinds of masks and disguises. "But all of them will be exposed under the revolution's spotlights," it said.

Regime's Enemies. After the numerous purges carried out by the Baathist regime during the past two years, one would think that they had got rid of all the "reactionary" enemies. Recent reports from Baghdad indicated that the main trouble the regime was having was with the leftist and communist elements.

The Baath Party has not been able to get these leftists to agree to join a Baathist-proposed form of "national unity" that would entail in effect the recognition by these groups of the Baathist leadership. A draft charter for the proposed front was expected to be announced as part of the celebrations marking the anniversary of the Baathist take-over in Iraq.

There was no indication in the new statements by President Bakr and Mr Takriti that they included the leftists and the communists in the category of "counter revolutionaries." But the editorial in AL JUMHOURIA saying that counter revolutionaries were hiding behind all kinds of masks and disguises appeared to suggest that none of the opposers of the regime is excluded.

From Within. The main danger that faces the regime is a break from within. The announcement yesterday that the Minister of Information, Salah Omar Al Ali, has been removed from his post may suggest that kind of trouble. This is because he is a prominent member in the Baathist hierarchy. He is also a member of both the RCC and the National Command of the Party.

He is the first prominent Baathist to be dismissed in such a way. His removal appeared to be under a cloud. Whether the dismissal will be followed by other similar steps remains to be seen. If it does, this means the regime is facing serious trouble.

B. J. M.

14/11



(3/13)

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BRITISH EMBASSY


BAGHDAD

1 August, 1970

Si. W. Turg
M. Ege
M. S.
M. D.
Curer.

Dear Acland,

Suspensions of British
Connivance with the
Iraqi Ba'ath



10
BMM
11/8
6/8.

Sam Falle's letter to you of 22 July on the above subject may call for comment from here.

2. The belief that the Ba'athist régime is supported by Britain, if seriously held by Iraq's neighbours, is not limited to them. I have from time to time reported that this ludicrous suspicion is current amongst non-Ba'athists here too - though no doubt the tongues of those who voice it are at least partly in their cheeks. The process of thought is, I suppose, as follows:- The Ba'ath cannot be kept in power by popular backing because there is none: they must therefore be enjoying the support of outside forces: in the past the dominant outside force has been the British: therefore it must be the British who (for some mysterious reason) are keeping these people in power. Most Arabs are of course unwilling to accept the distasteful fact that people get the Government they deserve.

3. If Kuwaitis, Iranians and others genuinely believe (which I doubt) that we support the Ba'ath and are conniving at their expansionist ambitions, this may be due to their pursuit of a similar train of thought.

Yours ever
H.G. Balfour Paul

(H.G. Balfour Paul)

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Tehran
Jedda

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leg

(a) copies to

MOO (OIA) sent 28/8
PUSD (ADJUTANT STAFF)
TDO (No Echelon)

Wes Post



Too much speculation
Too little fact

28

BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

22 August, 1970

(1/12)

then enter

Mr. Tammall (Oil Pers.)

Mr. W. (Newspaper)

28/8

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then submit

PMUN

28/8

Iraq Internal

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 1
2
NEQ 1/11.

There has been a feeling of some tension in Iraq during the last week and there have been a number of straws in the wind. I am not attempting in this letter to give you any calculated assessment, but thought it would be useful to give you an impression on how the straws are blowing.

2. At one of the first functions which I attended after returning I was told by an Iraqi friend, an ex officer, that although all was quiet at present "something" was likely to happen within two to three weeks. He referred to the increasing isolation of the Ba'athist Government, particularly the civilian element in it under Saddam Hussain, and stressed that they had no friends (incidentally, large numbers of people here continue to believe that the Government survives because of support from us!) The Kurds were becoming increasingly disillusioned about the prospects of the March agreement working out, particularly in relation to increased resources for the Kurdish area. The Persians remained hostile and liable to collaborate again with the Kurds. Saddam Hussain's visit to Moscow had not been a success and, of course, Egypt and Iraq were now at loggerheads. A group of Nasserist officers in the Army had recently gone to Syria in order to discuss collaboration with the Syrian régime against the Iraqi Ba'ath.

3. The officer concerned was not very explicit about what might happen but it seems that his apprehensions may be shared by the régime. There has been a full Ba'ath Party alert since 19 August and it has been suggested that the police have instructions to report immediately on the movement of any number of army vehicles together exceeding one. Moreover, police and military are more in evidence than usual at the radio station and other strongpoints as well as on all the key roundabouts in Baghdad. Jake Sharpe tells me that a number of tanks have been positioned at the military airport (formerly the civil airport in Baghdad prior to the opening of the new one)

/and

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LAST REF.	



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and for the last three weeks there has been a strange pattern of movement of armoured units - squadrons of 14 tanks moving from one military point to another without any clearly discernible reason. The arrest and subsequent release of the Egyptian Military Attaché's Sergeant Clerk, apart from provoking the Egyptians to retaliation (Jenner's letter 3/16 of today), may reflect uneasiness on the part of the régime that the Nasserists with the aid of the Egyptians are up to no good. The régime may also be apprehensive of how the Salah Al-Din force may react to the situation following the winding up of the Eastern Command.

4. One is continually speculating here on the relative importance of different members of the régime and their individual fortunes appear to rise and fall somewhat. There has been a rumour this week that Hardan Tikriti has been put under house arrest, but we have now been informed officially that he is to leave on an official visit to Pakistan on 23 August. Meantime, Rogers - still unfortunately here - has told me that he was advised earlier in the week by the Ba'athist Director-General of Roads and Bridges to get his Ambassador to make representations to Ammash or, failing him, Hardan Tikriti. When Rogers said that the Ambassador had already taken up his case with Saddam Hussain, the Director-General was inclined to pooh-pooh this as being of no great value. This is very surprising in view of the way in which Saddam has come into prominence over recent months but could conceivably be some reflection of differences between the senior military and the civil members of the régime. On the other hand, Saddam Hussain was reliably reported to have attended a private party earlier in the week in company with Ammash and Anwar Hadithi. All of them appeared to be completely relaxed and to be enjoying themselves hugely.

5. The situation therefore seems to be as complicated and confusing as usual. We should perhaps be ready for a storm, but it is equally possible, or even more probable, that things will go on very much as hitherto with the various parties somehow resolving any dangerous difficulties between them.

Yours Ever

D. F. Hawley

(D. F. Hawley)

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PUB. OF IRAQ

IRAQ SAID RECENTLY PROPOSED UNITY
WITH SYRIA: 'BUT DAMASCUS REFUSED'

Iraq, Syria

The weekly AL AHRAR, which speaks for the ruling Baath Party of Iraq, disclosed here this week that the Iraqi regime recently proposed unity with Syria, but the Syrian leaders refused. The weekly said this proposal was made earlier this month by an official Iraqi delegation during its talks with the Syrian leaders in Damascus.

It will be recalled that this Iraqi delegation, headed by Ali al-Khalki Samarra, member of the Iraqi Revolution Command Council (RCC), went to Damascus on a surprise visit Sept. 7th. The delegation reportedly held secret talks with the Syrian Head of State, Dr. Nureddin Atassi and other leading officials. (See our bulletin of Sept. 8th). AL AHRAR's report, as it says, contains details of these secret talks. It said that this was the third official Iraqi delegation to have visited Syria since Egypt and Jordan accepted the Rogers peace plan last July.

The Damascus Talks. According to AL AHRAR, Samarra made the following proposals during his secret meeting with Dr. Atassi: 1--Iraq and Syria should issue a joint communique backing the Palestinian commando movement against any attempt to suppress it; 2--Iraq and Syria should reorganize their respective military presence in the region in a manner as to defeat the commando movement on the one hand, and, on the other, to "protect the military institutions of the two countries from any aggression staged by colonialism, Zionism and Arab reaction"; 3--Iraq and Syria should work jointly in uniting the various commando organizations;

4--A congress should be held by Iraq, Syria, "the commando movement," Algeria and South Yemen, to assert these countries' rejection of the Rogers plan, to pledge further backing of the commando movement, and to appeal to UAR and Jordan to reconsider their stand on the plan. The same congress should also lay out a joint Arab information plan;

5--Iraq and Syria should call for a popular Arab congress to be held by the commando movement, all the progressive parties and movements which reject political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Such congress should urge the Arab masses to be mobilized for the struggle, and carry out contacts with other liberation movements in the world; 6--Iraq and Syria to achieve military unity between the two countries". Here, the paper quoted Dr. Atassi that Iraq was also ready for political unity with Syria.

Iraq's Reply. According to AL AHRAR, Dr. Atassi's reply to the Iraqi delegation was as follows: 1--Iraq's proposals have come too late; 2--Syria considers the Iraqi regime as "an enemy" in its stand towards the Syrian Baathists, "because Iraq has not fulfilled its obligations towards the Eastern Front". Here, the paper said, Dr. Atassi told the Iraqi team that Baghdad's claims as to the number of troops on the Eastern Front were inconsistent with the figures available in Syria, and, therefore, the Iraqis have not been up to their words with regard to their original contribution to the Front;

3--Iraq is still "plotting against Syria"; 4--The attitude of the Iraqi regime towards President Nasser of the UAR "is not correct", although Dr. Atassi believes that President Nasser is "wrong" in having accepted the Rogers peace plan; and 5--Syria considers the "political maneuvers, such as Iraq is now proposing, useless, since these would only complicate the position of the Arabs" as a whole. Therefore, the paper quoted Dr. Atassi as having told the Iraqi delegation, "Syria does not see any interest in accepting Iraq's proposals."

The Delegation's Reply. AL AHRAR went on to say that when Dr. Atassi finished his statement, Samarra replied to him by defending the policy of his country, and by upholding Iraq's attitude towards President Nasser. He reportedly told the Syrian Head of State that Iraq always considered Nasser as a responsible Arab leader whose important role, on the Arab level had special significance and force with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. But, he insisted, Iraq was not the first to start attacking Egypt for having accepted the US plan. He said by rejecting the US plan, Iraq, "as Syria is doing", is merely defining its attitude towards all such political peace settlements of the Middle East conflict.

P.H.
In M... 21/8
In M...
24/8

IRAQI BA'ATHISTS SHOW THEIR HAND

RECEIVED IN
EGYPT No. 10
NEQ 1/11

BY OUR POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT

WHILE Iraq's war of words with Egypt is reaching a crescendo, political observers are bound to seize the opportunity for a closer look at the Iraqi mind now that revelation is followed by revelation.

The main issue of debate is that Cairo says Iraq was all along trying to get out of the war against Israel and fabricated a crisis with Iran to make this possible. The Iraqis say the Egyptians should have divided their army in two and that Baghdad was really facing an Iranian menace.

Thus a glance at the chronology of events can be useful. In April 1969 the Iraqis woke up the Iranian Ambassador to Baghdad late at night to "invite" him to pay a visit to the Foreign Ministry.

Once the ambassador arrived at the Ministry he was led into the Under-Secretary's room where he was not asked to sit down, and was told without any ceremony that any ship flying Iranian colours in the Shatt would be fired at.

This took the ambassador by surprise. Until the very same day the Iraqis had been forthcoming, or appeared to be so, whenever Iranians suggested talks aimed at solving their differences.

Not long before that Iraqi Vice-President Hardan Abdul-Ghaffar al-Takriti had come to Tehran with "open arms". He had spoken of "putting our relations on a new basis" and "strengthening our eternal ties".

Admittedly, this had been followed with a series of provocative acts by the Iraqis. An Abadani fisherman had been killed by Iraqi patrols in the Shatt, 15 others had been arrested, border crossings had taken place on a minor scale. But the Iraqis had dismissed all these as "accidents due to ignorance and misunderstanding".

The Iranians, apparently taking this assertion at face value, had done nothing apart from going through normal procedures to get the kidnapped fisherman back. They did not even issue formal notes of protest.

What is interesting, however, is that the sudden call on the Iranian Ambassador

under the colonial treaty of 1937.

Iraq then waited for Iran's reaction, which came two days later. The delay was due to Iranian scruples. The government wanted to be absolutely clear as to whether or not al-Nemra had been sober when talking to the ambassador. There was no mistaking the Iraqi position; the threat was also relayed to Tehran through the Iraqi Embassy here.

The Iranians reacted by declaring the 1937 treaty as null and void and taking the only stand they could take, i.e. making it clear that "fire will be replied by fire". Then began Iran's military measures aimed at strengthening defences in the southwest.

The Iraqis had, thus, manufactured the situation they had desired. Three days after the Iranian announcement, Ghaidan was back in Cairo, this time with "evidence" that Iran wanted to seize Basra and the whole of southern Iraq.

But Ghaidan and his bosses in Baghdad were only newcomers to the world of diplomatic deception, while the Egyptians were masters of the art. Thus, Cairo immediately saw what the Iraqis were really after. Baghdad's heavy pressure on Cairo for a declaration of support against Iran came to nothing.

The Egyptians were proved right in suspecting the Iraqis when a few days after Ghaidan's return the Iranians publicly announced that they would be prepared to open talks with Baghdad at any moment. Through the Acting Foreign Secretary Abbas Khalafbari they made it clear that Tehran would also agree to an immediate withdrawal of troops from the border, provided Iraq agreed to do likewise.

Show spoiled
still further

dad's "Arabism in the Gulf". Everywhere he was told that relations with Iran are cordial and correct, and that there is no reason for fear.

But the Iraqis continued their muscle-flexing as "defenders of Arabism in the Gulf". They described their invented mission as "a sacred national duty". "Iraq," they said, "was ready to fight to the last to defend Arabism in the Gulf."

Once Baghdad was sure of its position as "defender of Arabism in the Gulf," the second act in the scenario was unfurled. This was the notorious attempted coup d'etat which, Baghdad claimed, was engineered by Iran, who did not want to see Iraq as "a powerful defender of Arabism in the Gulf."

Also served as
smoke-screen

The so-called "coup" also served as a smoke-screen behind which mass executions of various political opponents, including pro-Nasser elements, were carried out.

Once again the Iraqis rushed to Cairo with fresh "evidence". But then, as before, they found the Egyptians unsympathetic. Cairo was not prepared to accept Iraqi claims at their face value because it knew some of its own supporters has perished in the latest blood bath.

The Egyptians also knew too well that the Ba'athists had deliberately reversed one major aspect of President Aref's policy. Shortly before he was deposed by al-Bakr's group Aref had told the Egyptians he would commit the bulk of the Iraqi army to the Jordan front. This was a guarantee, in fact, that they had been stationed in Jordan when Aref was overthrown.

At the same time Aref had succeeded in reaching a series of agreements with Iran that would lead to the solution of all problems between the two neighbours. The Ba'athists lost

tions on a new basis" and "strengthening our eternal ties".

Admittedly, this had been followed with a series of provocative acts by the Iraqis. An Abadani fisherman had been killed by Iraqi patrols in the Shatt, 15 others had been arrested, border crossings had taken place on a minor scale. But the Iraqis had dismissed all these as "accidents due to ignorance and misunderstanding".

The Iranians, apparently taking this assertion at face value, had done nothing apart from going through normal procedures to get the kidnapped fisherman back. They did not even issue formal notes of protest.

What is interesting, however, is that the sudden call on the Iranian Ambassador had come only a few days after an Iraqi delegation headed by the then commander of Baghdad Garrison Sa'adun Gheidan had visited Cairo.

The object of the mystery visit was not to be known until last week when the Cairo daily al-Ahram revealed that the Iraqis then spoke of the Iranian "menace" for the first time and told the Egyptians that this would force them to withdraw their troops from the Eastern Front.

According to al-Ahram the Egyptians looked at the "evidence" produced by the Iraqis and decided that the whole thing was "a trick". They told Gheidan that they were not convinced that Iran was preparing for an invasion of Iraq and that the so-called "menace" of the Iranian Phantoms was nothing but a phantasmagoria.

Credible

excuse

Back in Baghdad, Gheidan reported to al-Bakr and Saddam Hussain al-Takriti, Iraq's real strongman. The message was clear: as long as Baghdad could not produce some credible excuse it would be impossible to withdraw from the Eastern Front and begin the political manoeuvring the Ba'athists had been dreaming of in the Persian Gulf.

So when the ambassador was brusquely brought to the ministry, the scenario had already been written for a sordid political game.

The Iraqi Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary Ne'ma al-Ne'ma was fully aware what Iran's reaction would be when he launched his molotov cocktail of "shooting in the Shatt". He knew that for Iran to remain silent in the face of a threat like this, delivered in a way that made any compromise impossible, would amount to a renunciation of sovereignty. The Iranian colours had always been flown in the Shatt, even

now what the Iraqis were really after. Baghdad's heavy pressure on Cairo for a declaration of support against Iran came to nothing.

The Egyptians were proved right in suspecting the Iraqis when a few days after Gheidan's return the Iraqis publicly announced that they would be prepared to open talks with Baghdad at any moment. Through the Acting Foreign Secretary Abbas Khalatbari they made it clear that Tehran would also agree to an immediate withdrawal of troops from the border, provided Iraq agreed to do likewise.

Show spoiled still further

This spoiled the Iraqi show still further. Gheidan was told by Nasser, Boumedienne, King Hassan and King Hussain that Baghdad should take up the offer and mend its relations with Tehran, so that Iraq can concentrate all its efforts on the war against Israel.

The Iranian offer for troop withdrawal was later repeated both publicly and privately through Kuwaiti, Jordanian and Turkish channels. The Iraqis chose to remain deaf. But before long they realised that their game had backfired. Even the Russians are believed to have told Vice-President Mehdi Ammash in Moscow that they were surprised at Iraqi moves.

Iraq's efforts aimed at disengaging its troops from the Eastern Front had come at a time the Israelis had begun to step up their attacks on the UAR front, engaging the Egyptian forces in almost daily battles. Clearly, the diversion of Iraqi forces to the Iranian border could benefit only Israel. And yet the Iranian troop withdrawal offer continued to be rejected.

Arab pressure later forced Baghdad to agree to preliminary talks with Iran at an ambassadorial level in Amman. But right from the start of these talks it was evident that Baghdad did not mean business.

When the whole show collapsed Baghdad tacticians began to devise a new scenario that might convince Cairo and Amman of Iran's "hostile intentions". This was the "Arabism of the Gulf" show. All of a sudden Baghdad began shedding crocodile tears about an Arabism which was supposedly being lost in the Persian Gulf because of Iran's "imperialistic designs".

A search for fellow-defenders of Arabism was launched in the Persian Gulf. The Bahrain issue hit the headlines in Baghdad as an example of Iranian "neo-colonialism". An Iraqi delegation, led by Abdul-Ghaffar, roved the region only to find out that no one was worried about Bagh-

had to Cairo with Iran "evidence". But then, as before, they found the Egyptians unsympathetic. Cairo was not prepared to accept Iraqi claims at their face value because it knew some of its own supporters has perished in the latest blood bath.

The Egyptians also knew too well that the Ba'athists had deliberately reversed one major aspect of President Aref's policy. Shortly before he was deposed by al-Bakr's group Aref had told the Egyptians he would commit the bulk of the Iraqi army to the Eastern Front. Two brigades had, in fact, already been stationed in Syria and Jordan when Aref was overthrown.

At the same time Aref had succeeded in reaching a series of agreements with Iran that would lead to the solution of all problems between the two neighbours. The Ba'athists lost no time in scrapping these agreements and broke all formal promises made by their predecessors concerning negotiations with Iran.

It was this background as well as the Ba'athists' obvious dishonesty that led to their eventual exposure as amateurish tacticians of political games.



1/12

CONFIDENTIAL

On the one hand, on the other... (10)

BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

3 October, 1970

Mr den P... RE. 9/10

(a) mod (DIA)
(c) Research Dept.
(a) 12/10

A little further information about the position of various members of the régime which may be of interest to you has come to light since my letter 1/12 of 26 September, 1970.

2. Hardan al-Tikriti's place in the Ba'athist Olympus has often been the subject of speculation, of which there has been a renewal. He was sent to Lusaka as Iraq's representative at the Non-Aligned Summit Conference and it had been intended that he should go straight from there to attend the United Nations session. However, he in fact returned to Baghdad suddenly on 14 September. What brought him back is not evident. Possibly he was himself suspicious that some action detrimental to his position might have been contemplated during his absence or possibly President Bakr urged him to return to offset the influence of the more extreme civilian members of the Party. Some stories have it that there was a major row between Bakr and Saddam in the early days of September and this could explain a decision on Bakr's part - his health is reputedly not good - to have Hardan back. On the other hand, of course, it may be wrong to read any particular significance into the change in Hardan's plans.

3. The régime showed solidarity at the top level on the occasion of President Nasser's death. Bakr called on the Egyptian Ambassador to convey condolences and he was accompanied by Saddam, Hardan and Ammash. This put paid to some of the more extreme stories which had been circulating about Saddam's fall from grace. On the other hand it seems fairly clear that Saddam's wings have been clipped to some extent.

4. Abdul Khaliq Samarrai has in the past been one of those advocating closer relations with the Communists and a Ba'athist/Communist alliance in Iraq itself. As regards the position of Abdul Khaliq Samarrai the Soviet Counsellor, Fedotov tells me that he has definitely not been removed from the R.C.C. but has been in Jordan and not in exile in Beirut as has been alleged. None the less some people maintain that, although Saddam's influence waned considerably after the visit to Moscow he has recovered his position, having worsted Abdul Khaliq al Samarrai, in the R.C.C. The cause of any

/difference

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- 2 -

difference between the two men is, however, obscure, but it is conceivable that it was due to some difference over Syrian policy. (Abdul Khaliq is reported, see attached, to have visited Syria on 7 September. The régime have still resolutely refused to be drawn into any local alliance with the Communists.

5. One still hears talk of a rift between the military and civilian wings of the Party and the possibility of a military "palace revolution" is openly discussed. Some people suggest that Ammash's position may be in danger. Certainly there has been a malaise in the Ba'ath Party at present and, though things here are calm, this lull could be deceptive. On the other hand the régime seem, at least for the time being, to have closed their ranks again in the face of the exceptional situation in the Middle East, though the underlying tensions and rivalries must remain.

6. There is still a great deal of wishful thinking in Baghdad about the demise of the régime, but the threat from the Nasserists which could in certain circumstances have existed before Nasser's death seems to have faded even though there are thousands of frustrated Nasserists who have been unable to express their feelings of grief adequately in any overt manner. A demonstration of mourning women was allegedly broken up by the police violently on 1 October. Any prospect of change there may now be seems most likely to come from some further shift of power within the régime itself.

Yours Ever

Donald

(D. F. Hawley)

Copied to: D.L.L. Stewart, Esq., C.M.G.,
CAIRO.

D. F. Murray, Esq.,
TEHRAN.

E. F. Given, Esq., C.M.G.,
BEIRUT.

CONFIDENTIAL

Cutting dated 16 OCT. 1970....., 19

P.R.M.H.

3

12

Struggle for power by Iraqi Ba'athists

From DAVID HIRST: Beirut, October 15

Mr Hardan Takkriti, one of Iraq's vice-presidents and a key figure in the Ba'athist regime, was today removed from power. Bagdad Radio announced that he is to become an Ambassador. Serious trouble, possibly marking the beginning of the end for this most unpopular of Arab regimes, now seems likely in Iraq.

The civil war in Jordan, quickly followed by Nasser's death, has sent shock waves around the Arab world, and the open split in the Iraqi regime, long in the making, is one of its more predictable consequences. The Ba'athists, after all their promises to intervene on the guerrillas' side, so flagrantly failed to do so that they have lost almost all credibility as a champion of the most sacred of Arab causes.

The Iraqi Ba'athists, like their Syrian counterparts, tend to divide into civilian and military wings, with Saddam Takkriti as the head of the party apparatus and Hardan Takkriti (no relative) as a principal champion of the army.

Siddam, secretary-general of the party, is the ruthless young

architect of sanguinary Ba'athist power, the moving spirit behind the show trials and mass executions and the manipulator of a dreaded intelligence apparatus.

Hardan looks after his officers rather like the late Field Marshal Amer did in Egypt. He ensures their comforts and amour propre. He is held to be exceedingly corrupt, in politics for the money, but, as a counterweight to Siddam, a humanising influence within the regime.

For all his reliance on police state methods, Siddam has to pass himself off, among rank and file Ba'athists, as a champion of the Ba'athist creed and Iraq's failure to come to the guerrillas rescue was unpardonable. Michel Aflaq, Ba'athist founder, who has consented to act as father figure for the Iraqi Ba'athists after despairing of the Syrians, was outraged, and demanded, from Beirut where he prefers to live, an act of public selfcriticism.

Neither Siddam nor Hardan, army or party, really wanted to intervene in Jordan, but in this climate of recrimination both are looking for scapegoats. Hardan is, perhaps, more

exposed than Siddam. It is reported that the guerrillas have proof that during the civil war King Hussein got in touch with him personally and bribed him to do nothing.

Last week, Hardan was reported to have emerged on top in the developing power struggle. Siddam has certainly been losing ground in the past two months but now it seems that he and the party have turned the tables on Hardan. If Siddam does win, Ba'athist rule, repressive enough as it is, will become more so.

The party, lacking the physical means of the army, cannot afford the slightest chink in its armour. But Siddam has taken a bold gamble. Supporters of Hardan will be tempted to strike back hard.

Whatever happens the regime has been weakened. What bound it together is less Ba'athist ideology than regional, almost tribal, solidarity. Hardan and Siddam, like President Bakr and many other leading Ba'athists, come from the small provincial town of Takkriti. Now the Takkritis themselves are falling out.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

NEQ 1/11

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PM

2/11

Today's Main News and Trends, Cont'd

Heikal reported that the disclosure about dispatch of the PLA forces to Jordan was made in a conversation between Nasser and commando leader Yassir Arafat. The latter, the report said, came to see Nasser to tell him of news that the Jordanian army was still attacking the commandos in Amman despite the efforts in Cairo to bring about a Jordanian-commando agreement. Arafat was so angry that he said: "We shall destroy the house on their heads and on ours". President Nasser calmed him, and said what was important then was to bring about a ceasefire because the commando position was not good, and it was important for the commandos to have a breathing spell to regroup their ranks. At this point, Nasser reminded Arafat of the airlift of the three PLA regiments from the Suez Front to Jordan, and of supply by the UAR of arms to commandos.

It will be recalled that President Nasser died of a heart attack twentyfour hours after Arafat signed the agreement with King Hussein for a ceasefire and for reaching a final accord on regulating future relations between the two sides.

Heikal's article today, which was longer than usual, basically talked of President Nasser's last 24 hours in life. During those 24 hours, Heikal conveyed to Nasser a message from the British Government, conveyed through the UK Ambassador, about the release of the commando hijackers in prison in Europe in exchange for the release by the PFLP of the rest of the hostages of hijacked planes. Heikal also was given a message from Nasser to be conveyed to US President Nixon by Mr Donald Bergus, the head of the US Affairs Section in Cairo, who was to go to Riyadh to see Nixon. The message said that Egypt was still interested in peaceful settlement in the Middle East, and that the "din" raised about the UAR missiles in the Canal zone had gone beyond all limits.

* * *

MIDDLE EAST. Initial UAR reaction to the Soviet plan for a settlement of the Middle East is favourable. The plan, the Cairo press coverage said today, seeks to eliminate "completely the consequences of the Israeli aggression of 1967, and provides for guaranteeing the rights of the Palestinian people."

There was no other Arab comment. Beirut's pro-Iraq AL KIFAH, in covering news of the plan, noted that the Soviet Union could not ask for more than what the UAR itself is asking -- meaning that the Soviet Union by confining itself to the Security Council resolution of November 1967, was going along with the UAR position which had endorsed the resolution.

Other newspapers today covered news of the Soviet plan on the front-page without comment. The plan, it will be recalled, provides for Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory in exchange for an Arab-Israeli peace (see our bulletin yesterday).

AS TAKRITI STRIPPED OF ALL HIS POWERS

Iraq

Split Inside Regime And Ruling Party Confirmed

A serious split appears to have developed inside the Iraqi regime, and inside the ruling Baath Party. One of the regime's top leaders and pillars has been stripped of all power, and appointed to the ceremonial post of ambassador to the Foreign Ministry.

A communique issued by the country's top-executive, the Revolutionary Command Council, declared that Air Marshal Hardan Abdel Ghaffar Takriti, the Vice President, has been stripped of all of his military and civilian posts, that he was retired on pension, and that he was appointed ambassador to the Foreign Ministry.

As usual when Baathists carry out a power upheaval, the measure was taken while Takriti was outside the country. He had gone to Spain on a official mission. He was due back in Baghdad yesterday. In fact, Takriti stopped in Beirut, rejected efforts by local Baathists to keep him in Lebanon, and resumed his trip to Baghdad. He has not been heard from since --and his arrival (or otherwise) in Baghdad has not been reported by RADIO BAGHDAD.

Centres of Power. Takriti was regarded as the second main centre of power in Iraq. The

Today's Main News And Trends, Cont'd

first centre is the ruling Baath Party, led, in the regime, by President Ahmed Al Bakr; Sidan Hussein Takriti, Assistant Secretary General of the Iraqi leadership of the Party and the Deputy Chairman of the RCC; and Lt-General Saleh Mahdi Ammash, the other Vice President. The friction and rivalry between the ousted Takriti and Ammash had been talked about from the first days this present regime came to power in Baghdad in July, 1968, in a coup that toppled the moderate regime of former President Abdel Rahman Arif.

A former Baathist, Hardan Abdel Ghaffar left the party in 1963 when he joined hands with late President Abdel Salam Arif in removing the Baathists from power then. Marshal Takriti always derived his power from the Air Force, where he is said to have large following.

No Surprise. Takriti's removal was not a surprise, as Beirut during the past week buzzed with reports of a split inside the regime and inside the Pan-Arab leadership of the Party. The split was over the failure of the regime to help the commandos during the recent Jordanian crisis. The Baghdad government failed to carry out a promise it had made of placing the 12,000 Iraqi troops in Jordan at the disposal of the commando movement. When fighting between the commandos and the Jordanian army broke out last month, the Iraqi troops in northern Jordan stayed out completely. This has discredited the regime tremendously in the Arab world. This was why the conclusion was drawn that Air Marshal Takriti has been made the "scapegoat" by the Baghdad rulers. They dropped him to try to gain altitude.

On the other hand, Takriti's removal could be part of what appears to be a bid by Baghdad to improve relations with Cairo. Takriti had gone on record with strong statements against the late President Nasser after the latter accepted the US initiative for a Middle East settlement.

Intra-Party Split. As to the reported intra-party split, Michel Aflak, the party founder and Secretary of the Baghdad-based Pan-Arab Command of the Baath Party, was reported to have fallen out with the Baghdad rulers over the Jordanian affair. It will be recalled that after Aflak's cables to Baghdad for help to the commandos brought no results, he ordered all Baathists to go to Jordan to fight on side of the commandos. Aflak resides in Beirut, despite the fact that the leadership he heads is centred in Baghdad.

OTHER PROBLEMS. The Iraqi regime has also been suffering of other problems, some with the Kurds, and some related to the economy. THE ARAB WORLD has reliably learned that a conflict between the Kurds and the Iraqi Government over the administrative future of the oil-rich district of Kirkuk is behind the announcement by Baghdad last week for the indefinite postponement of the population census which had been scheduled for later this month. The Kurds insist on sharing administrative responsibility of the Kirkuk district with the Government, and have accused the Baghdad authorities of a systematic campaign of bringing into Kirkuk as many Arabs as possible with the aim of diluting the Kurdish presence in the district. It will be recalled that the main aim of the census was to determine the size of the Kurdish population and the areas which they form a majority. The March 11th Declaration for settlement of the Kurdish problem promised the Kurds autonomy in areas where they form a majority.

Economic Problems. Other reports from Baghdad talked of a large-scale smuggling of currency outside the country. The reports said that this was the reason why the rate of the Iraqi dinar on the Beirut exchange market has dropped to LL7.20, while the official rate is at least LL9.

Travellers from Baghdad have reported a disagreement between the Polish group now in charge of development of the sulfur deposits at Mishraq in north central Iraq and the Government in Baghdad on the cost of equipment required for the project. The Polish team was reported to have asked for American-made equipment and valued it at 30 million dollars. The Government, after doing some checking, found that a US firm which had bid for the same project four years ago (at the time of the Arif regime) offered the same kind of equipment for only 23 million dollars. The Polish answer was that the cost of the equipment was specified in the agreement signed by the Polish and Iraqi Governments a few months ago on the sulfur project. Vice President Ammash had signed the agreement in Warsaw in behalf of the Iraqi Government.

The travellers reported the situation in and around Baghdad tense --and REUTER reports travellers as saying that there was unusual military movement around Baghdad during the past two days. Press speculations today said that Takriti's insistence to go back to Baghdad spelled trouble, and that he had gone there to defend himself and his position. But how he can do now that he has been stripped of all power, is not known.

Referring ousted officials to the Foreign Ministry has been a standard procedure. The Baathists did the same thing when they ousted Abdel Razzak Al Nayef, the first Premier who shared power with them when Arif was overthrown. On July 30th, 1968, only thirteen days after Arif had been overthrown, Nayef was ousted and later banished outside the country.

October 20st 1974

NEQ 1/11

IRAQI REGIME: YET ANOTHER POWER PURGE

Iraq

Since it came to power in July, 1968, the Iraqi regime has engaged in a series of purges against former partners and known enemies. The last of these purges involved former Vice President Air Marshal Hardan Abdel Ghaffar Takriti and his followers in the armed forces (see our bulletin yesterday).

All the purges so far appeared to be aimed at the consolidation of the leadership of the ruling Baath Party which tops the regime. Takriti's removal was not any different, and, in fact, appeared to follow the Baathist pattern of dropping former partners when this is possible.

In overthrowing the regime of former President Abdel Rahman Aref two years ago, the Baathists had joined hands with Aref's chief of intelligence, Col. Abdel Razzak Al Nayef. Nayef was made Premier for thirteen days, after which he was dislodged and put on the first plane out of Baghdad. The regime then turned to potential enemies, mainly the military blocs that had been the centre of power in Iraq since the overthrow of the Monarchy in 1958. Leaders of these blocs were either arrested, or tried as spies. The late President Abdel Salam Aref, who purged the Baathists from power in 1963 and who died in a helicopter crash in 1966, was posthumously condemned as a CIA spy last year.

The purge of the right-wingers came last January, after a group of them attempted, with Tehran's alleged assistance, to overthrow the regime. Forty-two were summarily tried and executed within a few days. In that, the regime wanted to purge the remaining right-wing centres of power.

Hardan Takriti and his followers endured, because the regime was busy with other purges, and because Takriti's influence inside the armed forces in general and the Air Force in particular was still needed. Some reports which came in wake of Takriti's ouster said that he had headed the special military committee which coordinated relations between the regime and the Iraqi armed forces. According to these reports, heated discussions developed inside the committee at the height of the Jordanian civil war. The argument reportedly revolved around whether the Iraqi forces in Jordan ought to side with the commandos in the fighting then with the Jordanian army. Cairo's AL AHRAM last week quoted informed sources as saying that at one of these meetings, a fist fight developed between Hardan Takriti and Sidam Hussein Takriti, the Assistant Secretary General of the Baath Party and the Deputy President of the Revolutionary Command Council.

(Sidam and Hardan are not related to each other. But they, like President Ahmed Hassan Al Bakr and several other leaders in the Baathist regime come from the town of Takrit, about 70 kilometres north of Baghdad. Because of the numerous Takritis in the regime, all of them have dropped the "Takriti" as a last name. They were now Ahmed Hassan Al Bakr, Hardan Abdel Ghaffar and Sidam Hussein, Sidam, however, is a cousin of President Bakr, according to reports from Baghdad).

Takrit was an important Baathist centre - and most of the Takritis joined the party at one time or another. They included Hardan Abdel Ghaffar (and former Premier Taher Yahya, who was arrested when the Baathists took over in 1968. Both Yahya and Abdel Ghaffar left the Party during the split of 1963, and sided with the then President Aref who in November, 1963, purged the Baathists from power). On the other hand, Hardan Abdel Ghaffar had a falling-out with Ar

SPECIAL REPORTS, Cont'dIraq

in December, 1963, and went through the experience he has gone through now. Aref stripped him from his official functions and assigned him as ambassador to the Foreign Ministry, then sent him to Brussels and into exile.

It was Aref's brother, Abdel Rahman, who became president on Abdel Salam's death in 1966 that allowed Abdel Ghaffar and a number of Baathists, including Saleh Mahdi Ammash, now a Vice President, to return home. They had promised to stay out of politics, but they did not, and used to meet regularly at the house of Bakr in Baghdad. At that time, and as they prepared for the coup against Aref, the Baathists recruited Hardan Abdel Ghaffar, because he reportedly still was influential in the Air Force. Abdel Ghaffar, however, was not re-admitted into the Party and therefore remained outside the inner circle, which today dominates the Iraqi regime. A strong antipathy reportedly developed immediately between him and Ammash, which later rubbed off on Sidam Hussein.

The Baathists, who depended more and more on Takriti for military support following Nayeri's overthrow, were at the beginning always careful to strike a balance between Takriti and Ammash. The two were always given equal treatment. This was one of the reasons which prompted the appointment of Bakr as Premier. Ammash and Takriti were first appointed Vice Premiers, and later as Vice Presidents.

The tug-of-war that apparently developed inside the regime between Takriti and the Baathist leaders, led by Sidam Hussein, over the Jordanian situation must have worried the Baathists, who may have expected Takriti to prepare for a movement to get them out of power. So, as the Arab proverb goes, "they decided to eat him for lunch before he ate them for supper." Applying an old Baathist tradition, they capitalized on his absence abroad on an official mission (on which they may have sent him deliberately) to remove him.

Regime's Identity. All these developments again raised the question as to the identity of the Iraqi regime. Officially, it is Baathist. President Bakr is one of the oldest Baathists in Iraq, and was always a member of the old Pan-Arab leadership of the Party under founder Michel Aflak. Mr Sidam Hussein always was known to have been an active Baathist.

On the other hand, Mr Aflak, who had refused to fully identify himself with the Iraqi regime when he refused to live in Baghdad preferring to reside in Beirut, an old favourite place, was recently completely disappointed with the Baghdad rulers over the Jordanian affair. Some papers perhaps in a big exaggeration, went as far as to say that Aflak has disowned the Iraqi Baathist

The rival Baathist faction in Damascus refuses to call the Baghdad regime a Baathist. When Syrian media refer to Iraqi Baathists, they mean Iraqis who support the Damascus-based Baath Party faction. The media also calls the Baghdad rulers as "right-wingers and lackeys of the British oil interests in Iraq." Damascus always dares the Baghdad regime to act against the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), the internationally-owned company which exploits Iraq's oil.

Some western quarters, notably American, say that the Baghdad regime is formed of pro-Soviet elements who had allegedly been reared for this role many years ago. This kind of speculation followed the series of agreements the regime concluded with Moscow and with the Soviet Bloc on development of Iraqi resources. There was the agreement on the development of North Rumaila oilfield with Moscow, the one with Poland on development of the sulfur deposits, and the contract with Czechoslovakia for the construction of a refinery at Basra.

- 7 NOV 1970

Cutting dated 19

IRAQ RULERS PURGE ARMY IN FIGHT TO RETAIN POWER

By JOHN BULLOCH in Beirut

THE civilian rulers of the Baath party in Iraq are moving quietly and ruthlessly to eliminate the last pockets of resistance to their ideas.

The army, a potent political force in its own right, is the latest target. What is going on is not a struggle for power, but a purge.

All power is in the hands of the 15-member Revolutionary Command Council, which is dominated by civilians.

These are party ideologists who are determined that old loyalties will not be allowed to check the course of "the revolution."

Iraq's failure to intervene on the side of the guerrillas during the Jordan civil war was made the excuse for the purge.

Marshal Hardan Takriti, the Vice-President and a senior Army officer in the Government, was accused of holding back the Iraqi forces, despite all his extravagant promises.

He was dismissed and exiled. But if there had been no conflict, another excuse would have been found.

In Baghdad I asked a senior official why the Marshal was dismissed. "He was becoming the centre of a grouping," replied the official, a senior party member.

"We cannot afford groups, or even the possibility that individuals may become centres of attention."

Then, obviously remembering Western reaction to the earlier brutal hangings in Baghdad, he added: "But we gave Marshal Takriti everything he asked for, money, goods, and let him leave the country."

Officers executed

Now, according to reports from Iraq, "something else" is going on. At least six Army officers are reported to have been executed and others have been dismissed or transferred.

Among those known to have been removed from their posts are Brig. Taha Shakarji, the man mainly responsible for thwarting last January's attempted coup, and Major-Gen. Hassan Nagib, Assistant Chief of Staff, who was in command of all Iraqi forces in Jordan.

The Army has always been the biggest threat to the régime. The Baath party has no popular, broadly-based support, and rules by a system of fear.

Secret police watch every move and infiltrate every organisation, so that opportunities for plotting are minimal except within the close-knit ranks of the Army.

Young and able

The young and able technocrats who have taken over the country's administration work desperately within the confines of party dogma to deliver the goods which the rulers have promised.

Given time, and with big Russian aid, the administrators will probably transform their country, but the purge now going on shows just how unsure the Baathists feel.

They know they are insecure and they believe that they have to be ruthless with any opposition detected.

Arafat calls for sacrifices

By Our Cairo Correspondent

YASSER ARAFAT, the Palestinian guerrilla leader, yesterday pledged at a Cairo rally to continue "with soul and blood" the path that began with President Nasser.

Mr Arafat, describing the former President as "the martyr of Arabism and the Palestinian revolution," said the Arab nation now faced the challenge of "despots, world Zionism and world imperialism and must strike all forms of sacrifices, thorns and pains."

The present generation, he said, was the "generation of the sacrifices and martyrs but would also be the generation of victory."

"We shall pay the price, no matter how costly or high," Mr Arafat declared to 20,000 people gathered to commemorate the 40th day after President Nasser's death.

General Mohamed Fawzy, the Egyptian War Minister, led units of the Egyptian Army to President Nasser's mausoleum, where they laid wreaths of flowers and stood in silent tribute for two minutes.

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Reference: 1/8

British Embassy,
BAGHDAD.

14 November, 1970

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Encl. and
to new file.

Mr. Egey
Mr. Trinch
Dear Richard,

R.E.
1/2. DISCORDS IN THE BA'ATH

R.E. 2/11

As you will be aware, relations between the National and Regional Commands of the Ba'ath Party (Iraqi version) have recently been severely strained. It is just possible that this particular Ba'athist quarrel may turn out to be of more than ephemeral or esoteric interest, and it may therefore be worth trying to understand what it is all about.

2. Ostensibly the quarrel between Aflaq's National Leadership and the ruling clique in Baghdad arose from the latter's vacillations over Iraqi military intervention in the recent Jordan imbroglio, Aflaq and his entourage vehemently dissociating themselves from the Baghdad leadership's final preference for discretion instead of valour. Aflaq's attitude was not based, one supposes, on any natural thirst for battle so much as on the feeling that the Iraqi's had made themselves look ridiculous and that the ridicule rubbed off on him as their ideological mentor. He and his colleagues may also have been under pressure from the Arab Liberation Front, the resistance movement controlled by the National Command (though financed by the Iraq Government). At all events Aflaq was sufficiently incensed to declare that the Regional Leadership and Saddam Hussein in particular were the enemies of Ba'athism (or words to that effect).

3. There has been a good deal of coming and going since then, Saddam himself having twice slipped off incognito to Beirut to try to patch things up and to organise a reconciliatory Party Congress in Baghdad. So far three of the lost sheep - the Syrians, Shibli al Aisami and Elias Farah, and the Sudanese Mohammed Suleiman - have been brought back to the fold in Baghdad; but Aflaq himself and one or two others of the runaway National Command have refused all requests to come to Baghdad for a meeting.

4. These are the externals but the discord certainly goes deeper than this single quarrel. It may first be worth defining what the functional relationship between the two Commands is all about. As I see it, the Iraqi Ba'ath needs Aflaq and the National Command to provide it with a sort of ideological certificate of respectability and to support it in its feud with the Syrian Ba'ath; while Aflaq and his fellow expellees from Syria need the Iraqi Ba'ath as a wagon to hitch their fallen star to. The arrangement might be expected to work well enough as long as Aflaq

/and his

R. M. Evans, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
LONDON S.W.1.

Reys

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- 2 -

and his non-Iraqi internationalists did not seek to dictate to the Regional Leadership on practical matters of Iraqi policy and the Regional Leadership deferred to them on points of doctrine (and paid them for their services). But there can scarcely be much natural affinity between a group of French-educated Levantine Intellectuals and an uncultured posse of Iraqi "politicians". Certainly there have been unpublicized local disagreements between them, e.g. over reaching agreement with the Kurds and over collaboration in certain fields with the Iraqi Communists. The present quarrel on an "Arab" issue - and one apparently involving substantial defections from the right-wing Ba'ath (if I must use this misleading term) in Lebanon and Jordan - is of a different nature but probably represents only the tip of the iceberg.

5. If they fail to patch it up and Aflaq, the founding father of true international Ba'athism, is left in petulant isolation, it seems to me just possible that the hard-headed, national-socialist pragmatists of Baghdad may, without saying so, wash their hands of internationalism for a time (it hasn't after all done them much good to date) and concentrate on cultivating their own kail-yard. If this were to happen, it would be of interest to us - though not necessarily of advantage, since they evidently consider the kail-yard to extend down the Gulf.

H. G. Balfour Paul

(H. G. Balfour Paul)

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LAST PAPER

Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

NEQ 1/11

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NEQ 1/11

2 December, 1970

Discords in the Ba'ath

Many thanks for your letter 1/8 of 14 November on this subject. Besides enjoying it very much, I found it very illuminating on an aspect of Arab affairs about which I have hitherto known comparatively little. I suppose that the "hard-headed national-socialist pragmatists of Baghdad" may want to see how Hafiz Assad decides to play Aflaq and the other Ba'ath's internationalists before choosing between the alternatives mentioned in paragraph 5.

2. Boyle of Hambros called on me on 26 November. He said a good deal about the prevailing political and economic situation in Iraq which I found interesting. He had clearly found it very useful to hear the advice which you and Donald Hawley had been able to give him.

(R. M. Evans)

LAST PAPER

His Excellency,
Mr. H. G. Balfour Paul, C.M.G.,
Baghdad.

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Strained Relations Within The Ba'ath Party And Related Series Of Power Purges; Structure Of Party Examined. The Ba'ath Party In Iraq. 4 Feb. 1971. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/1243. Newspaper Cutting And Diagram. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107475457/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=4b515e9c&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.